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SIXTH CIRCUIT DEFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NOTICE 
IN EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: 
A COMMENT ON TILLMAN V. MACY’S, INC. 
By 
Caroline Myrdek* 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
In Tillman v. Macy’s Inc.1 the Sixth Circuit clarified the employee notice 
requirement in work place arbitration agreements.2  The court conducted a fact focused 
review of the case before it in order to limit its prior holding in Hergenreder v. Bickford 
Senior Living Group.3 The court overruled the district court and found sufficient evidence 
within the language of brochures and mailers to conclude that the Plaintiff, Tillman, had 
been provided sufficient notice of an opt-out arbitration agreement with Macy’s.4 The 
Sixth Circuit’s deferential treatment of opt-out arbitration agreements in the employment 
field will likely encourage other businesses to follow the lead of Macy’s and adopt opt-
out arbitration procedures for all possible suits arising from employment. 
II.   BACKGROUND  
Plaintiff, Tillman, became a Macy’s employee in May 2005 when her previous 
employer, May Department Stores, merged with Macy’s.5 After the merger, Macy’s 
introduced the new employees to its Solution InSTORE program, a dispute resolution 
system.6  The program was a four step process with the fourth and final step consisting of 
binding arbitration.7 Employees could opt-out of the fourth step without penalty.8  
Macy’s educated its employees about the Solution InSTORE program in several 
different fashions. First, Macy’s sent an informational mailer to the employees’ 
residences.9 Next the employees  attended an informational session where they watched a 
                                                
* Caroline Myrdek is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Tillman v. Macy's, Inc., 735 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. Mich. 2013). 
2 Id. at 459.  
3 Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Group, LLC, 656 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. Mich. 2011). 
4 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 460. 
5 Id. at 455.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 457. 
9 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 455-56. 
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video on the program, and a confirmation mailer was sent afterwards.10 Finally, an 
electronic form on the program was sent.11 Furthermore, at the session, employees 
received an informational brochure on the Solution InSTORE program.12  
Although Tillman stated that she never received the mailings, they were sent to 
her address and were not returned as undelivered.13 Tillman admitted to attending the 
informational session when the video was shown.14 Tillman had the opportunity to fill out 
the opt-out paperwork several times, but failed to do so.15 Since Tillman did not opt-out,  
she received an electronic communication confirming her enrollment in the program and 
provided further information on the Solution InSTORE program as well.16 
Tillman filed a race discrimination suit against Macy’s in the district court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan based on an alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 after her termination of employment in 2009.17 Macy’s then filed a motion to 
compel arbitration and to stay the action pending arbitration.18 Macy’s argued to the 
district court that arbitration should be compelled in accordance with the Solution 
InSTORE agreement in place between Tillman and Macy’s.19 Tillman argued that the 
opt-out system in the Solution InSTORE program “did not amount to an offer to enter 
into an agreement to arbitrate, and that she did not accept any such offer.”20 The district 
court agreed with Tillman, relying heavily on the prior Sixth Circuit case of Hergenreder 
v. Bickford Senior Living Group, LLC21 and denied Macy’s motion to compel 
arbitration.22  
Since Tillman stated that she did not read the Solution InSTORE program, the 
district court held that “Tillman did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to a 
jury trial.”23 The district court also denied Macy’s motion to stay proceedings during the 
                                                
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 456. 
13 Id. 
14 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 455-56. 
15 Id. at 455-56. 
16 Id. at 456. 
17 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 455. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 456. 
21 Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Group, LLC, 656 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. Mich. 2011). 




appeal.24 Macy’s then filed a motion with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to 
stay the trial proceedings during the appeal, and the court granted that motion on June 19, 
2012.25 
III.   COURT’S ANALYSIS  
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by stating that only “[a] limited review is 
required before compelling an unwilling party to arbitrate.”26 The court then stated that 
since arbitration agreements are a special kind of contract, it would “review the 
enforceability of [the] arbitration agreement according to the applicable state law of 
contract formation."27 
A.  Macy’s gave ample notice of its Solution InSTORE program to Tillman.  
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court and held that Macy’s did 
adequately notify Tillman of the arbitration program. Although Tillman alleged that she 
did not receive the mailers, the court proceeded “on the assumption that she received the 
materials sent to her, because properly addressed and posted mail is presumed to have 
been delivered and received by the person to whom it was addressed.”28 Tillman also 
argued that while she was present at the meeting where the informational video was 
shown, the process was “breezed over.”29 The court countered Tillman’s statements with 
the fact that she was given brochures regarding the process and was even encouraged to 
conduct her own research on arbitration.30 
The court also relied on the actual language of The Plan Document, finding that it 
was clear and informative on the rights of the employees and the nature of the 
agreement.31 Further, the court found that the language the program directly stated how 
employees could opt-out of the program by signing and returning the form.32  
The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of the 
notice requirements in Hergenreder.33 The court emphasized the factual distinctions 
                                                
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.  
27 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 456; see also Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
28 Id. at 457  n.1.  
29 Id. at 455. 
30 Tillman, 735 F.3d  at 457.  
31 Id. at 459.  
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
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between the arbitration agreement in Hergenreder and in the Solution InSTORE 
program.34 In Hergenreder, the “dispute-resolution policy [] was not provided by the 
employer or made available save for a vague reference in an employee handbook that did 
not explicitly mention arbitration.”35 
The court likened Tillman’s case to the case of  Mannix v. County of Monroe,36 
where an employment arbitration agreement was enforced.37 In Mannix, the County  
“posted the revised [employment policies] at least four months before the [plaintiff's] 
termination . . . on an internal database available to employees [and held] meetings 
between department heads and employees and put the policies on the County's email 
system.”38 The court concluded that the discussions in both Hergenreder and Mannix  
supported its holding that Macy’s provided sufficient notice to Tillman to which Macy’s 
demonstrated its intent to enter into an arbitration agreement with Tillman.39  
B.  Tillman’s conduct following the communication of the Solution InSTORE 
communications constitute acceptance of the arbitration agreement.   
The Sixth Circuit stated that “[t]he manifestation of mutual assent may be made 
wholly or partly by . . . acts or conduct.”40 The court further noted that there is much 
support in Michigan case law that an offer may be accepted through continued 
employment.41 Therefore, Tillman’s conduct after receiving the communications of the 
offer demonstrably suggested that she assented to the arbitration agreement by continuing 
her employment and not returning the opt-out form at any point during her employment.42 
The court stated that “[t]he burden was on Tillman to show that she did not 
voluntarily and knowingly waive her right to a jury trial.”43 The court used the plain 
language of the agreement to find that Tillman did not meet her burden, and that the 
district court erred in finding otherwise.44 The Plan Document stated in part:  
                                                
34 Id. 
35Tillman, 735 F.3d  at 459.; see also Hergenreder, 656 F.3d at 414-16. 
36 Mannix v. County of Monroe, 348 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2003). 
37 Id. 
38 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 459 (quoting Mannix, 348 F.3d at 536). 
39 Id. at 459-60. 
40 Id. (quoting Ludowici-Celadon Co. v. McKinley, 307 Mich. 149, 11 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Mich. 1943)). 
41 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 460.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 461.  
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By agreeing to arbitration, the Associate and the Company agree to 
resolve through arbitration all claims described in or contemplated 
by Article 2 above. This means that neither the Associate nor the 
Company can file a civil lawsuit in court against the other party 
relating to such claims. If a party files a lawsuit in court to resolve 
claims subject to arbitration, both agree that the court shall dismiss 
the lawsuit and require the claim to be resolved through the 
Solutions InSTORE program.45  
The Sixth  Circuit concluded that “because the information conveyed in the Plan 
Document and brochure was part of a valid offer, and because Tillman accepted that offer 
by continuing her employment at Macy's without returning an opt-out form, it follows 
that Tillman knowingly and voluntarily assented to all of its terms, including this clearly 
stated waiver of the right to trial by jury.”46 
C.  Tillman knowingly and voluntarily waived her prospective civil rights claims 
through Macy’s Solution InSTORE program. 
The Sixth Circuit used five factors to evaluate if there had been a knowing and 
voluntary wavier of prospective civil rights claims:  
(1) plaintiff's experience, background, and education; (2) the 
amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the 
waiver, including whether the employee had the opportunity to 
consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) 
consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the 
circumstances.47 
Under the first factor Tillman argued that her high-school education was 
insufficient to provide the “experience, background, and education” necessary to 
knowingly waive her rights.48 The court rejected Tillman’s argument by emphasizing that 
the plain language of the agreement was written in a non-technical, easily 
comprehendible fashion.49 
 The court also stated that one factor alone is not dispositive.50 Under the second 
factor, Tillman had over a year to opt-out of arbitration.51  Under the fourth factor, 
                                                
45 Id. at 453.  
46 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 453. 
47 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 461. 
48 Id.  





Tillman made no argument for lack of consideration.52 Lastly, under the totality of the 
circumstances, considering the specific factual circumstances of the case, the court found 
that Tillman had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her prospective civil-rights 
clams.53  
Before concluding, the court noted that “opt-out schemes for accepting arbitration 
contain a risk greater than in opt-in systems that some employees do not know what they 
have agreed to.”54 But the court added that under Michigan law and under the 
circumstances in this case, the opt-out system was sufficient.55 The Sixth Circuit reversed 
the denial of the motion to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.56 
IV.   SIGNIFICANCE  
As arbitration continues to grow in the United States as an effective alternative to 
litigation, businesses such as Macy’s have been quick to adopt arbitration agreements 
with their employees. The Sixth Circuit has addressed the issue of “notice” in 
employment-related arbitration agreements several times in the past few years,57 
demonstrating the importance of adequate notice for adhesive arbitral contracts. This line 
of cases has established that the Sixth Circuit will take a highly factual look into the 
circumstances surrounding the arbitration agreement, concentrating on the fundamental 
fairness of the situation.  
The Sixth Circuit focuses on general feelings of fairness and clarity when 
determining if an employee was given sufficient notice, in other words, whether it would 
be fair to enforce the agreement against the employee. In Tillman, the Sixth Circuit went 
into great detail about its prior holdings regarding notice. Emphasizing that its holding in 
Hergenreder was confined to its facts, employees were not directly told about the 
arbitration program.58 This limiting focus on prior adverse case law points to the 
emerging, expansive view of adequate notice for the Sixth Circuit.  
The Sixth Circuit only took two sentences in its entire opinion to address an 
alternative to an opt-out agreement, an opt-in agreement.59 The court took a timid stance, 
                                                
52 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 461. 
53 Id. 
54  Id. at 462.  
55 Id. 
56 Id.  
57 See generally Kettles v. Rent-Way, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-230, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42921, 2009 WL 
1406670 (W.D. Mich. May 18, 2009); Mannix 348 F.3d 526; Hergenreder, 656 F.3d 411.  
58 Tillman, 735 F.3d  at 459.  
59  John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 
289 (defining an opt-in agreement where participants must take affirmative action to enter into a binding 
arbitration agreement with another party). 
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indicating that there is inherently more risk in opt-out agreements. The risk is that a party 
will be bound by an arbitral agreement that the party was not aware of prior. But the court 
stated it could not say opt-out agreements are insufficient under Michigan law, thereby 
indirectly supporting the use of  opt-out agreements in the state of Michigan.60  
In-house attorneys for corporations will likely point to this language for support 
of their choice to make opt-out arbitration clauses common in employment contracts. The 
only viable defense left to those opposing opt-out employment agreements is to argue 
lack of notice. This lack of notice can be due to unfair procedures by the opposing party 
that do not sufficiently educate and inform the opposing party of the arbitral agreement. 
This defense has been limited by the Sixth Circuit.61 If the minimum notice requirements, 
as stated in Tillman, are met the “lack of notice” defense will not prevail.  
Not only will there be an increase in employment arbitration agreements, there 
will be an increase in employment arbitration. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Tillman will 
further provide support for the growing involvement of arbitration in the world of 
business. 
V.   CRITIQUE 
The Sixth Circuit decision in Tillman addressed several aspects of arbitration. 
First, the court discussed the issue of jurisdiction, the decision of whether or not an 
arbitral agreement exists. Next, the court discussed at length the process and procedures 
used by Macy’s in order to notify its employees of the Solution InSTORE program, this 
program was in essence an adhesive arbitral contract.62Lastly, the court briefly discussed 
the advantages and disadvantages of opt-in and opt-out arbitral agreements. Although the 
Tillman decision was informative on the issue of notice in adhesive arbitration contracts, 
questions still remain regarding what in fact qualifies as adequate notice. 
 
A.  Jurisdiction in Tillman was not determined under kompetenz-kompetence. 
 
The decision in Tillman involved the threshold question of whether an arbitration 
agreement existed. Under the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz63 the court would not 
have answered this jurisdictional question, the arbitrator(s) would have done so.64  
The court could have given even more deference to arbitration by concluding that 
the arbitrator, not the court, should decide if the opt-out agreement was valid. When 
arbitrators are given the power to determine their own jurisdiction (i.e., whether an 
                                                
60 Tillman, 735 F.3d  at 462.  
61 Id.  
62 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 457. 
63 Kompetenz-kompetenz is a principle which parties may choose to incorporate into their arbitration 
agreements, but which is not part of U.S. law per se. See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. 
v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 287 (3d Cir. N.J. 2003). 
64 Id. at 276 (holding that under kompetenz-kompetenz an arbitrator can examine his or her own 
jurisdiction without interference by a court). 
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arbitration agreement exists), they will be more likely to find an agreement, or else they 
would lose the opportunity to arbitrate the claim. 
B.  The Solution InSTORE program is an example of an adhesive contract.  
Adhesive contracts have been a point of controversy in the progression of 
arbitration.65 The Sixth Circuit did not address the concept of adhesion when it discussed 
the arbitration agreement in Tillman. Although, the agreement in Tillman is adhesive, it 
was placed on the weaker party, the employee, by the much stronger and sophisticated 
party, the employer. While the agreement did have the option of opting out of arbitration, 
without consequence to employment, employees did not have the power or ability to 
change any terms of the agreement.66 The agreement was offered to employees on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, mimicking the characteristics of an adhesive contract.  
The court focused on the circumstances surrounding the agreement to determine if 
notice was fair, similar to the determination of whether a contract is conscionable.67 In 
adhesive arbitration contacts, courts look to the procedural and substantive 
conscionability of the contract to determine if the contract is enforceable.68 Procedural 
conscionability looks to the circumstances and the process of contract formation.69 
Substantive conscionability looks to the terms the agreement itself and whether deception 
or ambiguous language was used.70 Although the Sixth Circuit did not state that it was 
using a conscionability test, its process mirrored such a test. The court looked to  the 
circumstances exposing Tillman to the arbitration agreement.71 The court also used the 
language of the agreement to find that it was written clearly to convey what the 
agreement was.72  
The Sixth Circuit focused on how “fair” the formation of the arbitration 
agreement was, but did not consider the terms of the arbitration agreement. Although 
                                                
65 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempts state law 
and allows for class action waivers in adhesive arbitral agreements). 
66 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 457.  
67 Id. 
68 See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1268 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2004); Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 
F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. Mass. 2007).  
69 Nyulassy, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1268 (stating that “[a] mandatory employment arbitration agreement that 
contained a unilateral agreement requiring only the employee, not the employer, to arbitrate any and all of 
his employment claims, required the employee to submit to discussions with his supervisors as a condition 
precedent to arbitration, and placed a maximum time limit of 180 days from employment termination or 
when the dispute arouse lacked mutuality and rendered the agreement substantively unconscionable.”). 
70 Id.  




employees had the option of opting-out, ninety-seven percent of employees did not.73 In 
order to have an adhesive contract, like the one in Tillman upheld, more about the 
agreement should be known. For an arbitral employment agreement like this one to be 
considered “fair,” the stronger party should bear most of  the expenses of arbitration; 
selection of the arbitrator(s) should not favor the stronger party; and the location of the 
arbitration should be convenient for the weaker party. 
C.  Opt-out and opt-in contracts benefit opposite parties to arbitration. 
The alternative to an opt-out arbitration agreement is an opt-in arbitration 
agreement. There is more of a burden on the employer if an opt-in agreement is used.  
The likelihood of participation in the agreement will most likely be less than an opt-out 
agreement, since a party must take some sort of  independent action in order to opt-out. 
But there is more protection to employees in opt-in agreements, these employees must 
make a conscience decision to choose arbitration and then act on their decision. The Sixth 
Circuit in Tillman did not attempt to balance these considerations.  The court in Tillman 
only addressed opt-in contracts to state that opt-out contracts are acceptable under 
Michigan law.74 
The arbitration agreement in Tillman specifically stated that employment 
discrimination claims were to be arbitrated. 75 The Sixth Circuit used a five factor test to 
determine if the Plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to litigate civil 
rights claims arising from her employment.76 Although arbitration has been expanded to 
legally cover statutory claims, even civil rights claims,77 this decision expands 
arbitration’s coverage even further.  Under Tillman, employees can waive their right to 
litigate civil rights claims through an adhesive opt-out arbitration clause.78  
D.  Unanswered questions after Tillman.  
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the time frame Tillman had to opt-out gave her 
ample time to consult an attorney.79 This language seems to support that employees have 
a duty to consult an attorney when given paperwork from their employment on 
arbitration. This seems to be a large burden for low level employees.   
                                                
73 Id. at 455.  
74 Id. at 462.  
75 Id. at 461.  
76 Id. 
77 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
78 Tillman 735 F.3d at 462. 
79 Id.  
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Attorneys are not cheap, and the time to find and consult an attorney can be costly 
as well. It is an easier task to do personal research on the topic of arbitration, which the 
court also encouraged.80 The Tillman court noted that the agreement itself included 
resources for learning information on arbitration.81 What is unclear from this decision is 
the extent to which an employee has a duty to pursue information on arbitration and to 
which an employer is responsible for providing that information.  
 In Tillman, Macy’s took four steps in order to notify the Plaintiff of the opt-out 
arbitration agreement.82 These steps included mailers, a video, an informational meeting, 
and electronic communication.83 The court held that combined, these steps provided 
sufficient notification to the Plaintiff of the arbitral clause.84 
 What is unclear from this decision is how many steps and what kind of 
communications are necessary, at a bare minimum, to provide notice of an opt-out 
arbitration agreement in the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit has had several opinions 
addressing notice, but if the court adopted a bright line rule for notice, it would not have 
to continue addressing the issue.  After this decision, employers may adopt an identical or 
very similar process to Macy’s Solution InSTORE program in order to ensure that, if 
challenged on notice, the Sixth Circuit will uphold the arbitration agreement. 
VI.   CONCLUSION  
In Tillman, the Sixth Circuit upheld an adhesive opt-out arbitral agreement 
between a highly sophisticated employer and its employee. The court stated that the 
inclusive agreement covered arbitration of all matters pertaining to employment, 
including civil rights claims.85 This decision favors employers and corporations, allowing  
for employees to waive their right to a jury trial for all possible future claims arising from 
their employment. Based on the decision in Tillman,  employers, specifically in the Sixth 
Circuit, will likely adopt opt-out arbitration clauses with their employees.  If these 
employers follow a basic and fair notification policy, as outlined in Tillman, these 
arbitration clauses are likely to be binding.86
                                                
80 Id.at 457.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 456-57.  
83 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 456-57.  
84 Id. at 456.  
85 Tillman, 735 F.3d at 462.  
86 Id. at 457.  
